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Reply 
The privilege of having three sets of extensive and hard-hitting comments on one’s work 
is as welcome as it is rare, and especially so on this occasion as the lectures were, for me, but the 
first (well, not entirely first) stab at a subject I hope to explore at greater length. The reflections 
that follow will respond to some of the criticisms, but will not be a point by point reply. I will use 
the occasion to clarify some obscurities in the lectures, and to contrast my view with some of my 
critics' own positions. I will proceed thematically, starting with some observations about method 
and about ontology, proceeding to explore several questions about the relations between social 
dependence and relativism, between genre, value, and normativity, and concluding with a few 
words on pluralism and liberal values. 
 
 Method and ontology 
My aim is explanation, explanation of concepts which are central to our practical thought, 
to our understanding of ourselves as persons, capable of intentional action, namely an explanation 
of the closely related concepts of value, of being a value, and of having value or being of value. 
In explaining a concept we explain aspects of that of which it is a concept. An explanation of the 
concept of value is a (partial) explanation of the nature (i.e. essential properties) of value. And as 
the differences between explaining concepts and explaining the nature of what they are concepts 
of is immaterial for the current discussion I will proceed on the assumption that the lectures 
aimed at this dual task, which is discharged, for the most part, by the same explanations (often 
suitably modified to apply either to value or to the concept of value).1 I make no claim that it is 
impossible to understand the notions of being a person, or of reason or intentional action, without 
using the concepts I am trying to explain. It is merely that for those who have them they play a 
central role in understanding intentions, reason and persons, and that for those who have them 
possessing other routes to an explanation of intentions and persons involves understanding how 
those other concepts relate to the value concepts which are the subject of these lectures. For those 
who have them the understanding of intentional action, and of being a person, and of much else 
depends, among other things, on understanding the interrelations between their concepts and 
value-concepts. 
                                                     
1  On this as on many other points in the lectures and the reply I will be relying on arguments I 
advanced elsewhere, especially in Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). To avoid 
tedium I will not refer again to that book. But let me mention that the view of concepts presupposed here is 
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Neither my lectures nor the comments on them embarked on an extended discussion of 
the methodological assumptions behind the enterprise, and it would be inappropriate to do so 
here, except to the extent that some methodological issues are pertinent to an evaluation of 
several critical observations made by Korsgaard, Pippin and Williams. Before I turn to them two 
brief and general remarks regarding the nature of the explanatory task as I see it. First, it is a 
constructive-theoretical task. It aims at explaining central concepts, concepts which can be 
compared to crucial links at important junctions connecting central features of our thought, and 
thus contributing importantly to the structure of our thoughts. But the idea of a concept used in 
philosophical analysis generally, and mine is no exception, while being recognizably related to 
‘concept’ in its ordinary meaning, deviates from it considerably in pursuit of theoretical aims.2 It 
is part of the enterprise of explaining the basic features of human thought, an enterprise which 
gives concepts a central role in articulating those features. So the explanation of concepts is an 
explanation of human thought as we know it, using the notion of a concept as a tool of analysis. 
I do not assume, and indeed do not believe, that there is a fixed budget of philosophical 
problems the explanation of which is the perennial task of all philosophy. Rather, I assume that 
there are indefinitely many philosophical puzzles, different ones gaining prominence at different 
times, different ones being felt as pressing at different times. The task of explanation is never 
ending. Still, there are some typical philosophical preoccupations and one of them is the desire to 
explain the possibility of a unified worldview, that is, one where our understanding of any 
domain coheres with our understanding of all other domains. Many recent writings about 
practical thought aim at presenting a so-called naturalistic view of practical thought, because the 
writers believe that the only way to reconcile practical thought with our world view is to show 
how it can be integrated in a naturalistic world view. I am not confident of the cogency of the 
ideal of ‘a naturalistic worldview’, but the aim of explaining the coherent relations between our 
practical thought and other domains of thought is one of the background goals of my lectures. 
Do my commentators share this understanding of the task? It may appear that they do not, 
but matters are not altogether clear. Pippin explicitly criticizes my conception of my own 
endeavours: 
                                                                                                                                                              
delineated with a little more detail in “Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial 
Comparison”, Legal Theory 4 (1998), pp. 249-282, reprinted in J. Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
2  The same is true of the concept of ‘the nature of …’ or of ‘essence’. They too are philosophical 
concepts, used as they are for theoretical reasons, and not identical with the concepts expressed by these 
words in non-philosophical English. 
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Parenthetically, we might raise the question of how politically and socially conservative 
Raz’s position might be. … This question arises because, even though Raz’s “separation 
thesis” between explanation of existence, and evaluation of value would allow “for 
radical criticism of social practices”, that criticism would appear bounded in a way by the 
results of the social dependence thesis, and bounded in a way that suggests that the 
separation of social explanation of value from first-person evaluation itself, is already 
breaking down. There are apparently normatively relevant consequences to be drawn 
from the social dependence thesis: there are some values about which it is “pointless” to 
argue; proposing new values without due attention to context and realizability can lead to 
“fanaticism”; and the social dependence thesis “points to caution in understanding the 
contribution of such revolutionary innovations”.[REF] 
“Separation thesis” is Pippin’s coinage, presumably referring to two of my claims. First, 
that the enterprise I am engaged in is one of explanation of aspects of central concepts like that of 
a value, and not the enterprise of establishing what values there are, or what is of value and what 
is not. Second, the more substantive claim that, conventional goods apart, the existence (or 
absence) of a sustaining social practice is not part of the case for establishing that something, say 
fraternity, is a value, or that something, say chastity, is not.  Neither of these claims is challenged 
by the, to my mind, correct observations Pippin is making in the quotation above (and related 
ones elsewhere in his comment). 
Pippin seems to me right, and I never denied, that an explanation of a concept can have 
normative, or evaluative3 consequences.  It is easy to think of propositions which, if true, are part 
of an account of (the concept of) value and which have normative implications. For example, it is 
plausible to think that a reasonably comprehensive, correct account of value will entail either that 
nothing of value can exist, or its negation, that is that possibly something of value exists. Or that a 
reasonably comprehensive, correct account of value will entail either that there cannot be any 
values, or its negation, that is that there are some values. 4 Needless to say if a correct account of 
value entails either of these propositions then it has normative implications. It follows that it is 
possible for a correct account of value to have normative implications, and that it is plausible to 
think that any reasonably comprehensive correct account has such implications. There are many 
other normative implications which correct accounts of value have, and it is impossible to 
enumerate or exhaustively describe their general character independently of knowledge of the 
content of that account. 
                                                     
3  Except where otherwise indicated I use the terms interchangeably 
4  Regarding both examples it is possible that neither of the theses would be entailed by an account 
of the nature of value. But given (a) that an account of a concept (or of the nature of that of which it is a 
concept) is likely to be informative about the possibility of its instantiation, and (b) that such propositions, 
central to the understanding of the concept, object or property in question, will not lack truth value, it is 
plausible to make the assumption I make in the text. 
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Needless to say there are other ways in which a correct understanding of the nature of 
value can quite properly affect people’s normative views. People’s views are often based on or 
supported by confused notions of the nature of value, whose dissolution will help people to avoid 
making evaluative mistakes. 
Perhaps I should add here that there is another separation thesis which my lectures do not 
entail, and which I believe to be unfounded. Some people may hold that while a correct account 
of the nature of value is likely to have normative implications, its cogency cannot be properly 
supported by evaluative considerations. A more plausible version of this view distinguishes 
between normative considerations which apply specifically to theory-construction and other 
normative considerations. It claims that only the first kind of normative considerations bear on 
the cogency of accounts of value, but not the second kind. I do not believe that this exclusion or 
separation can be sustained. Our understanding of the nature of value inevitably derives in part 
from what we take to be obvious or clear cases of values: Freedom, beauty etc. I do not mean that 
our views that this or that is a clear case of a value cannot be revised, or that it cannot be revised 
in light of an improved understanding of the nature of value. Such revisability is consistent with 
the fact that part of the case for any account is that this or that is a clear or obvious case of value. 
Hence evaluative considerations do legitimately count in favour of the account of the nature of 
value. We are very far from affirming the separation thesis that Pippin rejects. 
Pippin points to several considerations which he takes to be inconsistent with the 
separation thesis. One of them is that there can be successful reductive explanations of value 
claims: 
Surely, [he writes] there are some value claims for which a reductive explanation (one 
which attends to what people believe are values, but doesn’t look any longer for 
evaluative justifications) is appropriate.[REF] 
And to be sure there are such cases (though I do not think that the explanations involved are 
reductive). My claim was that the correctness of ‘value-claims’ can be established only by appeal 
to other value-claims (though one may appeal to the circumstances in which people acquired their 
evaluative beliefs to establish the probability that they are correct: they may have had reliable 
teachers, etc.). The same is true of establishing that people’s evaluative beliefs are unfounded. 
That too can be established only by appeal to evaluative considerations (if only because 
establishing that an evaluative belief is mistaken often amounts to establishing that its negation - 
also an evaluative belief - is correct). However, here too there is room to appeal to the 
circumstances in which the belief was acquired or held to explain why a mistaken belief appeared 
credible. Such explanations of error are particularly pressing when the mistaken belief is 
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widespread and the circumstances in which it is held make it difficult to accept that everyone 
could have been mistaken. Such doubts may undermine the credibility of (evaluative) arguments 
to establish that it is mistaken. Explanations of why the error occurred, how the erroneous view 
could have seemed plausible, etc., are therefore valuable in reinforcing the evaluative arguments 
against the views concerned.  
On occasion the circumstances under which a view is held may be such as to undermine 
the credibility of those who hold it thus. Given those circumstances we may deny that they are 
reasonable to hold it, even when we do not know why the view is implausible, or what is wrong 
with the reasons (if any) which those who hold it think they have for it. In these cases 
explanations of why the belief is held do all the work: we may have no other reason to doubt the 
belief but, knowing that it is held because …, we cannot have any faith in it. We realise that we 
would hold it whether or not it was true, that our belief is not sensitive to its truth; that it is 
immune to critical-rational control and will not change in response to rational considerations 
only. Therefore that it cannot be trusted. 
It is possible that Pippin and I agree or at least that we do not disagree, it is possible that 
he said nothing inconsistent with my view on the relationship between explanation of value and 
justification. If so then how ‘politically and socially conservative’ is my position? When the 
phrase is used in its main meaning being conservative is not a matter of rejecting or affirming any 
value. Rather, it is a matter either of epistemic caution in concluding that one understands the 
values correctly (that is the context of my observation about fanaticism to which Pippin refers) or 
of minding the possible adverse consequences of a single-minded pursuit of some values, of not 
allowing oneself to be blinded to the relevance of other values. In its secondary meaning ‘being 
conservative’ means supporting certain substantive evaluative views, that is those which are at the 
time of speaking thought of to be such as are predominantly supported by people who are 
properly or excessively conservative (depending on the speaker’s own views on these matters). 
Pippin points to various ways in which some of my observations can be used in support 
of conservative caution. But at no point does he either allege or show that they can be correctly 
used to support wrong views. Perhaps his reticence is just a matter of politeness, but it is 
important nonetheless. There is nothing in the social dependence thesis, or in my arguments for it, 
which supports the status quo and opposes change, or which supports “traditional values”, say 
traditional ideals of the family, and opposes “new values”, say values which sanction non-
traditional forms of personal relationships.  Besides, I am not sure that my position is relevant to 
the concerns he gestures towards. One does not need to accept the social dependence thesis to 
argue cogently that ‘there are some values about which it is “pointless” to argue’ or that 
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‘proposing new values without due attention to context and realizability can lead to “fanaticism”’. 
These are vague, but so far as they go sound points to make, the merit of which is visible to all, 
whatever their understanding of value.   
I will revisit these and related matters when commenting on ‘liberal values’ and the like. 
For the time being let me return to the question whether we all share the same understanding of 
the enterprise we are engaged in. Williams, e.g., writes  
I am not convinced that we are helped in thinking about these things, and I suspect that 
we are hindered, by asking questions about the conditions under which various values 
exist. I do not think we would lose anything if we dropped this way of speaking 
altogether.[REF] 
When the enterprise is explanatory, one may think, the advice ‘let’s drop this way of speaking’ is 
out of place. Does that not show that Williams is engaged in a different enterprise? But as usual 
things are not that simple. Is Williams advocating conceptual reform? This is not clear, but if he 
is what could be the grounds for such reform? Conceptual reform can be a result of analysis 
which uncovers incoherence in our concepts (the classical example, however controversial its 
success, is Russell’s revision of the concept of a set to avoid his own set paradox). It could also 
be a result of analysis which establishes incongruence between the presuppositions underlying the 
use of some concepts and fundamental aspects of our worldview. Williams has argued in other 
publications that values do not belong to the absolute conception of the world. I joined others in 
expressing doubts about his views on the subject. These do not matter here. What matters is that I 
agree that philosophical analysis which points to such incongruities in our basic concepts opens 
the way to conceptual change. So there is no clear evidence here that my enterprise is any 
different from Williams’. 
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Very likely Williams recommends no conceptual revision in the quoted remark. He may 
simply mean that certain ways of framing the quest for explanation are unhelpful, and may lead 
the unwary to accept false assumptions about values. If the advice is addressed to the ways we 
express ourselves in ordinary, or most philosophical discussions of evaluative matters, including 
arguments about the value of this or that, then I completely agree. We do not often talk in these 
words about the existence or non-existence of values, nor is this to be regretted. My defence of 
discussing the dependence of value on practice in terms of existence conditions has to do with 
another way in which use of the term value in theoretical discussions deviates from its standard 
English meaning.5 The reason is that there we are interested in a broad category of evaluative 
properties, whose explanation has much in common, and there is no common term in English to 
cover all of them. Values are what those which possess the evaluative properties have in virtue of 
their possession. Their possession of value is what we are trying to explain, as well as the relation 
between the general possession of value and the specific nature of the properties which endow 
their possessors with value, that is, the relation between having value in general and being a value 
of a specific kind is part of the explanatory task.  
Allowing that it is justified to use, in theoretical inquiries, ‘value’ in this partly stipulative 
broad sense, talk of the existence of values is both inevitable, and inevitably odd-sounding on 
many occasions. It sounds odd, for using a standard philosophical jargon I sometimes talk of the 
existence of values, etc., where normally we would talk, and that does not sound odd at all, of the 
question whether there are values, whether something is a real value (or really a value) etc. I have 
no desire to see the use of ‘existence of values’ locutions spread. Yet they are sometimes helpful 
in sharpening and in forcing distinctions in answers to the inevitable questions that I discuss. The 
question of the existence of values arises in ordinary, that is non-theoretical, discourse, as well as 
having a systematising role in theoretical discussions. The concept of value is such that claims 
such as "some people believe that piety is an important value, but in fact it is not a value all",  
“the belief that values are universal is false. There are no universal values”, “not all reasons 
derive from values”, whether true or false are meaningful, and import questions which in the 
standard philosophical jargon can be expressed by reference to the existence or otherwise of 
values.  
Some would deny that in explaining claims such as those we need to refer to values. 
Korsgaard is among them. She believes ‘that talk of the existence of values at this level is just 
misleading shorthand for something else, namely valuing, which is a thing that we do.’ She is 
                                                     
5  I remarked on this in the lectures above. 
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right that often reference to values is best seen as a reference to what people do, or may, value. 
For example, "modesty is an old value, whereas independence is a new one", “Aztec culture was 
unique in having embraced so many false values”, “middle-class values are very different from 
working-class values” are best understood to state that people have long valued modesty, whereas 
only relatively recently did they come to value independence, that the Aztecs valued many things 
which were of no value at all, and that in general people of the middle class value different things 
from working-class people. Yet, I think that she is wrong in thinking that such paraphrases apply 
everywhere and enable us to do away with the thought of values. This is so primarily because 
valuing can be right or wrong and it is right or wrong depending on whether what is valued 
possesses or fails to possess the value-property because of which it is valued, or at any rate some 
value-property in virtue of which its valuation is right, or in the absence of which it is wrong.  
Observations such as the preceding one lead many to the view that discourse about values 
simply refers to evaluative properties, that is properties possession of which necessarily endows 
their possessors with some value.6 Discourse about beauty is about the property of being 
beautiful, etc. I think that every value correlates to a specific evaluative property. However, 
considerations of the temporal dimensions of value advanced in the lectures suggest that values 
cannot be identified with their corresponding properties, since properties do not have a temporal 
dimension. In other words, consideration of the existence of values is required not so much to 
explain locutions such as ‘the value ... exists’, but in order to explain the relations between values 
which govern and partly constitute genres, and the genres which they govern, which beyond 
doubt have a temporal dimension. This is but one of a range of considerations forcing on us 
recognition of the temporal dimension, and therefore (in order to make sense of it) recognition of 
the existence of values. Another consideration will be mentioned below, as it is relevant to the 
relationship between the social dependence of value advocated here, and social relativism. 
 
Once a value comes into being it bears on everything without restriction 
Pippin correctly remarks that  
Our relativist will simply claim a stand-off on the most important issues. It does not 
follow, she would argue, that the failure of the social dependence thesis to warrant a 
relativist conclusion all by itself establishes anything about the autonomy or non 
relativity of value claims.[REF] 
                                                     
6  There may be a case for broadening the category of evaluative properties beyond those captured 
by this characterisation. But for present purposes it will do. 
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It was not my aim to refute any version of evaluative relativism, and I presented no arguments at 
all against any version of relativism. I contrasted my view with a broad family of relativistic 
alternatives (never precisely characterised in the lectures) first to help the reader see that my view 
differs from theirs, and second to show how some of the reasons which prompt people to endorse 
versions of social relativism can be satisfied in an account which is not relativistic.  
There is no simple summary of the way my view is not a relativistic one, if only because 
there are so many different versions of relativism, and my account diverges in different ways 
from different versions. Indeed, there is nothing to stop someone from defining a version of 
relativism of which my account is an instance. After all, I believe that values are - generally 
speaking, and subject to exceptions and modulations - dependent on social practices. I take that 
claim to be at the heart of social relativism. Perhaps the crux of the difference between my 
account and social relativism, in all its varieties, is that according to the view I explained in the 
lectures (1) four important types of value – pure sensual and perceptual pleasure, aesthetic value 
of natural phenomena, many enabling values, and the value of people and others who are of value 
in themselves – are at most indirectly dependent on social practices and (2) once a value comes 
into being it bears on everything without restriction.  
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That last sentence merits further explanation. As Williams points out I take a sustaining 
social practice to be ‘an emergence condition’ for the existence of a value, not ‘a continuation 
condition’. The reasons are many. Here is one, which I regard as particularly forceful.7 Many 
values are mixed values: The value of being a good opera consists in the way visuals, music, 
words and action, each with their own forms of excellence, combine. As explained in the lectures, 
we can think of a value as defined by, or constituted by a standard of excellence of a certain 
type.8 Since many values are mixed values, their standards of excellence refer to other values, and 
their required combination makes the values they define distinctive.9 They are distinct because 
whatever possesses this complex mixed value excels in a way other than simply by possessing the 
component values. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts, that is, the value of the whole is 
greater than its value measured by the sum of the component good-making properties it 
possesses. The thought sounds complicated but is elementary: a good film is good in ways other 
than as a collection of good photos, a collection of funny episodes, etc. The way they combine 
determines its value as a film, which is different from its value as a collection of good shots, good 
jokes, etc. Hence, being a good film is a distinct good-making property corresponding to the 
value of films.10 
The crucial step in the argument is that any combination of values can constitute a 
distinct value. That is that there are no combinatorial principles which dictate that only certain 
ways of combining values can be required by standards of excellence, and other combinations are 
ruled out: they cannot constitute distinct complex mixed values. If that is accepted, and I will not 
argue for it here, it follows that there could be as many values as possible combinations of values, 
that is an indefinite number. We know, however, that not all those possibilities represent real 
values, not every possible combination is a distinct value. For example, one can criticise an 
object, say a film, for having the right components but failing to integrate them well. Sometimes 
such criticism can be met by pointing out that it mistakes the genre the film belongs to: it would 
                                                     
7  I relied on it for the first time in 1991 in a paper which is now chapter eight of Engaging Reason. 
8  I will discuss Korsgaard’s objection to this point below. 
9  To avoid misunderstanding, or the kind of slippage that according to Korsgaard I am guilty of in 
the lectures, let me clarify that mixing values means possessing the respective value properties, and 
possessing them in the right relationship, as required by the values in question. Where the meaning is clear 
I spare the reader such complicating clarifications. 
10  Notice that here, as elsewhere in the lectures and in this reply, I use examples loosely. I do not 
stop to consider whether ‘film’ designates a kind partly constituted by a distinctive form of excellence, or 
whether that is true of story-telling films, documentary films, etc. but there is no larger genre “film” 
marked by its own distinctive excellence. 
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be justified had this been a psychological drama, but it is a romantic comedy, and the elements 
are well integrated because they are related as they ought to be for a good romantic comedy.  
If there were as many distinct values as possible combinations of values it would never 
be possible to criticise a film, or anything, for failing to integrate its elements well, for there 
would always be some other value which it exemplifies to a high degree.11 But this is nonsense. 
We cannot refer to any possible way of relating component values as a value, only a subclass of 
combinations is. The social dependence thesis claims that only those which, at some point, were 
supported by a sustaining social practice are existing values, only they can justify actions, 
emotions, etc. in the ways that values can. Two factors combine to give sustaining social practices 
the role of emergence conditions, to borrow Williams’ term. First, the crucial assumption I 
mentioned above was that there are no evaluative considerations which can determine which 
combinations of values are a distinct value. Social practices meet the bill for they are concrete 
facts, rather than evaluative considerations. Second, they make the contours of the value learnable 
and graspable by people, they concretise a standard of excellence making it available for people 
to learn and be guided by. Hence, the special social dependence thesis can explain how some 
possible standards of excellence, some possible combinations of values, are distinct values and 
others are not. It explains it in a way consistent with our conceptual practices, with the way in 
which we distinguish legitimate valuations and illegitimate ones. 
Once a sustaining social practice comes into being, and the value emerges, there is no 
reason to think that it will not continue to exist if the practice dies out. It has been concretised 
through the practice, which can be learnt about and understood even after it no longer exists. 
Moreover, we do actually refer to such values, whereas we do not refer to pure possibilities as 
values.12 
Grant, therefore, that cultural values, for they are the important type of value subject to 
the special social dependence thesis, depend on social practice for their emergence, but not for 
their continued existence. In what sense do they, once they exist, bear on everything without 
                                                     
11  I am assuming, of course, that the value applies to the instance in question. Since these values will 
most likely be kind-based, this implies that the instance will be of the relevant kind. This assumption is 
based on the thought that items can be instances of a number of kinds, and that there could be different 
kind, differing only in what constitutes excellence in them, whose condition of membership of the kind is 
that the item be better if it belongs to that kind then if it belongs to any other. That means simply that it 
belongs to the kind if it excels by its standard more than by any other standard of excellence. 
12  This point has to be qualified to allow for the deliberate efforts of people to innovate and create 
new genres with their attendant values. I will not delineate the ways such innovative discourse differs from 
the invocation of existing old values. The differences should be familiar to the observant reader. 
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restriction, since that is meant to be an important difference between this view of social 
dependence and the standard social-relativistic view? The answer is in what has just been granted. 
To use Williams’ terminology again, sustaining social practices constitute emergence conditions, 
and not - as they do according to standard social relativism - application or validity conditions.  
Social relativism is not to be confused with the claim that cultural values are genre-based. 
Korsgaard asks whether buildings on Mars realise the values of classical architecture. They may 
possess the component properties which contribute to excellence in the classical style, such as 
symmetry, serenity and solidity. There is no problem in asking about any building whether it is 
serene, symmetrical or solid. The view that cultural values are broadly genre-dependent claims, 
however, that to possess the values of the classical architecture a building has to belong to the 
classical style. Membership of a genre, being an instance of the classical genre in this case, is 
determined in ways which may be (but need not be) independent of how it would excel by the 
standard of the style were it an instance of it. Only buildings in the classical style can excel in the 
classical virtues (allowing that buildings of other styles can be marginal cases of two styles, refer 
to other styles than their own, etc. etc.).13 
Korsgaard seems to take this to show that my view is relativistic after all. That conflates 
genre-based evaluation with relativism. It is not common to think that those who rightly believe 
that only novels can be either good or bad novels are thereby committed to relativism. There is no 
reason to think that if all cultural values are genre-based the resulting account is relativistic in any 
significant way. Williams wonders whether the social dependence thesis implies that once the 
value emerges it can be applied to the evaluation of events which took place, or practices and 
institutions, etc. which existed before its emergence. The question is important, but complex and 
cannot be fully addressed here.  The short, and dogmatically presented, answer is as follows: 
1) Formally once a value has emerged it can apply to everything, without temporal 
restrictions. Many values are, however, genre specific. Only films can be judged as good 
or bad films, only parties as good or bad parties. Many values which are subject to the 
special dependence thesis cannot apply to anything which happened or existed before 
their emergence. The value of poetry emerges with poetry, the value of marriage with the 
institution of marriage, etc. Therefore there can be neither good nor bad poems, neither 
good nor bad marriages before the emergence of the values by which they are judged 
good or bad.  
                                                     
13  The explanation of the genre-dependence of many values is briefly repeated below. 
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2) There is an important exception to the generalisation about the non-existence of instances 
to which directly socially dependent values can apply before the emergence of the value. 
Not infrequently new values arise as a generalisation of more specific ones. The notion of 
a work of art or of literature is more recent than that of a painting or a sculpture, or of a 
play or a poem. Such new concepts emerge accompanied by new values, leading to a new 
understanding of the more concrete genres, and their values, to which they apply. Now a 
poem is an instance of literature, open to comparison with novels, and stories, and plays, 
to be judged as a work of literature. Such more general values do have instances which 
existed before they emerged. Those instances were hitherto regarded as belonging to 
previously existing genres and subject to evaluation by their standards. They still belong 
to these genres, but now they are also seen as subject to the more general standard of the 
more general genre. Here we come closest to a retrospective application of a value to the 
period before its emergence. 
3) There is another kind of evaluation, one which does not depend on the existence of 
instances to the evaluation of which the value in question applies. It may be that the life 
of people was impoverished, that opportunities for having a fulfilling life were very 
limited, etc. because when they lived many values, or some specific ones had not yet 
emerged. We pass judgements of this kind regarding the existence or lack of 
opportunities to take advantage of valuable possible activities and life styles. We regret 
that some art forms, or some sports are available only to the rich. Judging a life to be 
impoverished or enriched by the absence or presence of valuable opportunities is 
indifferent as to whether their absence is due to the non-existence at the time of the 
values, or of good instances of them, or of opportunities to relate to them in the right 
way.14  
4) Finally, there are of course various values which do not depend on sustaining social 
practices, and apply to any suitable object whenever it exists. 
None of these observations quite meets Williams’ point about ‘not having any external moral 
comment to make’ when thinking about the remoter past. He qualifies this remark by noting that 
it does not apply to all values, and that  
                                                     
14  Needless to say, such judgements presuppose that the value in light of which they are made is 
available, and applies, either because it falls under the observation above (point 2) or because it is not 
subject to the special dependence thesis at all. 
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it is at most an option. There is no logical or semantic rule which rules it out that I should 
condemn the High Middle Ages for not adequately respecting the principles of the First 
Amendment: it is simply not a very sensible thing to do.[REF] 
I believe that I entirely agree with the sentiment here expressed. Where I feel less certain is 
whether we agree about the reasons for holding that it is simply not a very sensible thing to do. I 
am not sure what Williams’ reasons are, and am not entirely sure that I understand my own. To be 
very brief about this let me just say that they seem to me to be a combination of conservative 
caution, and moral suspicion. The caution is due to a sense that we are all too likely to 
misunderstand people who live in circumstances very different from our own, and who believe in 
very different values, or at least in values which they articulate very differently from the way we 
articulate ours. It is all too easy to miss the meaning of activities, relationships or practices to 
people whose values we do not altogether share, too easy to dismiss them as worthless, too easy 
to fail to see the good in them, or to overlook that they display values we share in unfamiliar 
ways. The moral suspicion is of the need people may have to judge others, particularly when the 
object of the judgement is remote.  
 
Values, genres and normativity 
The general thesis of the lectures is that by their nature many values depend for their 
emergence on sustaining social practices, and that most others depend indirectly on social 
purposes for their existence; appreciation or opportunities to use them depend on such practices, 
or on values of the first kind. Furthermore, that the values successful engagement with which can 
give meaning to life are, directly or indirectly, socially dependent in these ways. If this is right 
then contingent facts affect which values exist and the forms they take. This raises various 
difficulties, and in the lectures I pointed to and tried to deal with only a few of them. One obvious 
problem is how is the threat of contradiction avoided. Given that opposing criteria of qualifying 
as good (say, as a good painting) are to be found, as when we commend one painting for its 
quietly harmonious character and another for its assertive dissonance, are we not committed to 
the view that one and the same painting is both good (for its quiet harmony) and bad (for lacking 
dissonance)? I pointed out that we avoid such contradictions because when we judge anything as 
good due to a value which is subject to the special dependence thesis we do so in stages. First, we 
identify a kind to which it belongs, a kind which by its nature or constitution is governed by a 
particular value, (i.e. by the standards of excellence for being good of that kind); and secondly, 
we judge the item under consideration good (or bad) to the extent that it is good (or bad) of its 
kind. This allows us to recognize the existence of values with apparently contradictory criteria.  
  
15
 
Korsgaard is right to say that this account leaves many unanswered questions, though we 
are not always troubled by the same questions. She thinks that ‘there is the problem of the bad 
genre’, but I am not sure what the problem is. There would have been a problem had my claim 
been that every genre is a genre of some value or other. But I did not make such a claim. Rather, I 
argued that some values (those subject to the special dependence thesis) are genre-based.  
Korsgaard also asks (regarding the wider genre to which classical architecture may 
belong) ‘What is the wider genre or genus in this case? Western architecture? Decorative 
architecture? How about “architecture”?’[REF] This raises the question of the relations between 
genres and sub-genres. In the following comments, as in the lectures themselves, I will be 
concerned only with genres or kinds which are governed by distinct values. So, for example, to 
establish whether classical buildings belong to decorative architecture, western architecture or 
architecture we have to establish first whether the categories in question are evaluative 
(architecture – perhaps, western architecture - no, etc.), and then whether the buildings under 
consideration belong to those which are.  
There is no reason to think that either all buildings in the classical style belong to another 
genre (say decorative architecture) or none do. Some may also be examples of decorative 
architectures while others may not. Some genres are, however, sub-genres of others, in the sense 
that necessarily any member of the sub-genre belongs to the genre. Necessarily all historical 
novels are novels, all comic operas are operas, etc. I assume that Korsgaard’s reference to wider 
genres is to the genres to which sub-genres refer. Her brief comments suggest the thought that the 
parent-genre provides means of assessing the relative value of instances belonging to different 
sub-genres. For example, think of two novels. One is a very good detective novel, the second  
merely a good bildungsroman. Korsgaard’s implicit suggestion is that the second may be better 
than the first if it is a better novel than the first, even though it ranks lower in terms of its sub-
genre that the first in its sub-genre. That is not a necessary implication of the views I expressed in 
the lectures. The standard of excellence of a genre may simply determine that good instances of 
different sub-genres are good instances of the genre, without providing for their comparative 
ranking. It all depends on the nature of the genre and its standard of excellence. Nor is there any 
general reason to think that given any two items the one ranked highest in the ‘widest’, to use 
Korsgaard’s term, genre to which they both belong is the best. There may not be an overall 
ranking of their value. One may be better in one way, and the other in another way.  
These points may help explain the radical pluralistic implications of my view, and the 
wide-ranging incommensurability of values which is its natural concomitant. But they do not take 
us to the heart of Korsgaard’s disagreement with my views. For me, comparing Korsgaard’s view 
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of values and normativity with my own is tantalizingly elusive.15 There seems to be much that we 
agree on. But important disagreements remain. I said that values have no point except to be 
enjoyed or engaged with by valuers, and that there can be no meaning to the life of valuers, and 
no point in being a valuer except through the enjoyment of and engagement with values. I also 
suggested that our grasp of the concepts of value and valuers is interdependent, that we cannot 
fully grasp the one without the other. There are other, closely related, theses about the 
interdependence of values and valuers. Korsgaard regards this view of the reciprocity and 
interdependence of valuers and values as unsatisfactory. It leaves my “theory chasing its own 
tail”, she says.[REF] Somehow valuers, people, have the priority in that they are the sources of 
normativity, and they endow values with normativity. Her view of the priority of valuers is 
corroborated by an understanding of values which is, in spite of superficial similarities, very 
different from mine. Let me start with that difference. 
                                                     
15  This is partly because Korsgaard poses the questions to be explored in terms which makes sense 
only if her, or more broadly a constructivist, explanation of normativity is correct. For example, her central 
question is about the sources of normativity. I do not think that normativity has sources, or rather the 
metaphor (normativity flowing from its sources) does mischief, and does not help. It is possible to say that 
my promise is the source of my obligation to do as I promised, or that Congress is the source of our (legal 
and therefore, in the circumstances, also moral) obligation to pay income tax. But it does not make sense to 
talk of the source of normativity in general, any more than it makes sense to talk of the sources of 
properties, or the sources of objects.  
I therefore find her analogy of values (on my view) and people misleading. People are not the sources of 
their own rights, nor of other people’s duties towards them (voluntary and legal obligations like promises 
excepted) any more than great paintings are the sources of the duty to respect them. To be sure we would 
not have such a duty if the paintings did not exist, etc., but there is nothing gained from calling them 
sources of the duties, and doing so invites confusion. I do not believe, as Korsgaard thinks that I do, that 
values are sources of normative claims. That an object (or event or institution, etc.) possesses an evaluative 
property makes the proposition that it does true. But that does not make the value a source of any claim any 
more than the fact that my car has stalled is the source of a claim to that effect.  
If, however, constructivism is correct then normative claims are not like other statements. Other statements 
that some things have a certain property or stand in a certain relationship are true if they possess the 
property or stand in the relationship, but normative claims are made true not by things being as they say 
they are but by the fact that there are valid sources for them, whatever they may be. In attributing to me 
views about the sources of normative claims Korsgaard overlooks the fact that talk of ‘sources of 
normativity’ has a proper role only within a constructivist approach, and should be introduced only after the 
validity of that approach has been established. 
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Commenting on my remark that the very idea of opera, friendship, or the state is a 
normative idea in that we understand the concept of an opera or friendship or of the state in part 
by understanding what a good opera is like, or a good, or successful friendship or a good state, 
Korsgaard points out that if Plato or Aristotle were right then the same is true of all objects. 
Perhaps, though I doubt it. I doubt it because I doubt that they had a use for the concept of value 
which we have today, given that their notion of perfection was bound up with the thought that all 
objects have a natural tendency to seek their own perfection.16 Given that I am no expert on the 
topic it is lucky for me that we do not have to pursue it, since Plato and Aristotle were wrong, and 
so, it seems to me, is Korsgaard. It is not the case that "we understand any kind of thing by 
understanding what a good or well-functioning thing of its kind is".[REF] The simple reason is 
that regarding many kinds of things it does not make sense to ask what is a good or well-
functioning thing of that kind. There are no good or well-functioning stones, or pebbles, or 
streams, or hail, or snow, or mountains, or stars, or black holes, or electrons, or photons, etc.  
As Korsgaard remarks "this may make you feel that we have got derailed 
somewhere."[REF] And indeed it does, and, I believe, we have. It shows that Korsgaard is not 
really thinking about values at all, and that has far-reaching consequences for the rest of her 
argument. Of course, hers is not a simple mistake. It is a considered response to a problem. I will 
try to explain how she is led to her view in stages.  
First, some ground clearing. Korsgaard not only attributes to me, but accepts herself the 
identity of values with the standards which are constitutive of kinds such that it makes sense to 
say that there are better or worse instances of that kind, kinds like assassins, chairs, oak trees, and 
rhododendrons. She also thinks that all kinds are of this type. I have commented on that second 
claim above, so let us turn to the first.  
                                                     
16  Perhaps because Korsgaard overlooks this point she attributes to me the view that the function of 
opera is to be a good opera. I doubt that opera has a function, (though different operas may have had 
different functions at different times). If it has a function it is not to be an opera, nor to be a good opera. I 
am not at all sure what these expressions can mean. Nor, I have to admit, do I understand what is meant by 
"standards entirely unique" to a particular object, or of an object "being perfect of its kind, where its kind is 
given just by itself". Perhaps I should add that it is not my view that appreciating sunsets is a social 
practice. It seems to be some sort of mental activity, or an ability to engage in such activity. However, I do 
believe that to appreciate the beauty of a sunset in the ways we do does presuppose various beliefs (e.g. 
such as exclude the thought that sunsets are signs of the end of the world) and a range of attitudes to nature 
whose availability depends on one's familiarity with socially acceptable attitudes to nature, knowledge of 
aesthetic values, and experience of the ways sunsets featured in culture, their symbolic significance, their 
portrayal in the arts and literature, their role in romantic love, etc. This does not mean that only experts in 
all of the above can enjoy sunsets. It merely means that how one enjoys a sunset, how a sunset strikes one 
intuitively and instantly, depends on one’s knowledge and experience of such matters. 
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As I argued in the lectures, where X is a kind which is governed by an intrinsic value (i.e. 
partly constituted by the standards of excellence of that value)17 we can move from something 
being a good X to it being good or of value (a good object, etc. or one of value, etc.) simpliciter. 
A good assassin, as Korsgaard is, of course, aware, is not in virtue of being an assassin a good 
person, or good or of value, nor is a good hydrangea valuable or of value because it is a good 
hydrangea. Admittedly all such objects may on occasion be of instrumental value, and some of 
them – i.e. useful artefacts – are normally of instrumental value. Only normally, for the uses for 
which they were created may cease to exist. Instrumental goods are only contingently so and 
therefore instances of species which are good if they are instrumental goods are only contingently 
good or of value. Furthermore18, that something is good or of value entails that there is reason to 
respect it (e.g. not to damage it), as well as reason to engage with it in the way appropriate to its 
value (enjoy looking at it if it is a painting, or listening to it if a piece of music, etc.). The two 
points (if it is a good X then it is of value, if it is of value there is reason to respect it, and reason 
to engage with it, or enjoy it) mark the difference between values, even those which are genre 
based, and kinds constituted in part by standards of excellence in the kind. Not all such kinds 
satisfy the two conditions, and therefore, not all of them represent values. 
In a way Korsgaard agrees with these points. At least, she agrees that there is no reason to 
do anything just because it is a good instance of a kind constituted in part by a standard of 
excellence in the kind. The difficulty is that she tends to think of values as constituted by such 
intrinsic standards of excellence of any standard-constituted kind. Hence her ‘values’ are not 
normative – there is no reason to care about them, or to behave in any special way regarding 
them. Again, I agree with her on that but take it to show that being good of a kind is in itself not 
being of value, and the relevant kind-constituting standards are not necessarily standards which 
constitute distinct values or any values at all. For I take values to be inherently normative. And it 
seems that Korsgaard does not. She says that   
‘you have reason to care about the values internal to a thing, or perhaps even have to care 
about those values, when the thing is in a certain way yours.’[REF]  
Later she explains that we have to care about our health because it is physical excellence and we 
have a physical nature, and we have to care about cultural excellence because we have a cultural 
nature. So where do we disagree? First, as already stated, I believe that values are inherently 
                                                     
17  I will leave out of consideration here things, persons, etc., which are of value in themselves. See 
on that topic Chapter Four of my Value, Respect And Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
18  A point developed in Value, Respect And Attachment. 
  
19
 
normative, i.e. that possessing evaluative properties is inherently related to reasons: we have 
reasons to pursue actions which possess evaluative properties. Korsgaard treats values as if they 
are not inherently normative. Second, I believe that if Korsgaard thinks that having reasons is 
having reasons to care then she overstates the weight of reasons, and mischaracterizes them. 
Third, I do not share her view that we have reasons to care for what is ours, and only for that. 
 The first point, that values are inherently normative, seems to be a simple and generally 
known fact about them. While Korsgaard seems to dissent from it, she also seems to think that we 
should only care for what is of value, and that seems to suggest an intrinsic connection between 
value and normativity whose nature, in her view, is not clear to me. 
 The second point is of some importance. I believe that reasonable belief that an action 
possesses an evaluative property makes its performance intelligible, and if it does possess such a 
property then, other things being equal, its performance is justified. In other words, I am among 
those who believe that possession of a value-property (i.e. the property corresponding to a value, 
in the way that being beautiful correspond to the value of beauty) constitutes a presumptively 
sufficient reason for an action. That does not mean that we have reason to care for everything of 
value. I agree with Korsgaard that the fact that good Ming pots are beautiful (i.e. of value in that 
way) does not mean that I have reason to care about Ming pots (I will explain this below). That is 
consistent with the belief that the intrinsic value of actions (a) provides reason to do them, 
whether or not we care about them, and whether or not we have a special reason to care about 
them; and (b) our views about the intrinsic value of actions makes it intelligible that we care 
about what we care about, as well as featuring in the justification of our caring about it, when the 
caring is justified. 
To clarify: Caring about an action, or a relationship or pursuit, is more than doing it, or 
engaging with it. It involves a certain attitude towards it, and it involves letting concern for it play 
a relatively important role in one’s life which includes prioritising it relative to other matters one 
has reason for, but which one does not care about (what one must or must not do excluded). 
Hence while, by the nature of value and of reason, the value of what we care about is a 
presumptively sufficient reason to engage in it, it is not necessarily a presumptively sufficient 
reason to care about it. That is consistent with it being a reason for caring about it, in the sense of 
necessarily being part of the case for caring about it.19  
                                                     
19  By ‘special reasons’ for caring above I meant presumptively sufficient reasons. I wanted to 
emphasise the fact that the value of what we care about is  a reason for action (and for appropriate attitudes) 
even though it is not a (presumptively sufficient) reason for caring about anything. 
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There are cases where we must do things we do not care about. Possibly, in all such cases 
we should care about them. But caring about them is not a condition without which we have no 
reason to do them. Furthermore, there are many mundane things we do almost every day simply 
because they are sensible things to do in the circumstances, even though it would be wrong to say 
that they connect to anything we care about. At the moment, for example, I sit in a waiting room, 
waiting for my appointment. I hear the applause of the crowd from a TV in an adjoining room, 
and realizing that people there must be watching Wimbledon’s men’s singles finals I go there to 
watch. I do not care about the match or about its result, nor do I care about watching it, or about 
anything else connected with my action. I am not bored (I could carry on writing this reply), nor 
have I any other instrumental reason to watch the match. It is simply an (intrinsically) good thing 
to do, since it is enjoyable. That is an example of how the intrinsic value of things furnishes 
reasons for action, independently of what we care about and of what we have special, i.e. 
presumptively sufficient, reason to care about. 
Turning to caring: We need not care about everything of value. But we should not care 
about things of no value. The value of what we care about gives us reason to care, making our 
caring intelligible to ourselves and to others, and contributing to its justification when it is 
justified. Hence intelligible caring presupposes the existence values, and an account of reasons 
for caring cannot make an account of values redundant. So far for the second point of possible 
difference between Korsgaard and me. I do not think that we help ourselves by trying to explain 
normativity or the role of value by reference to caring and the reasons for it. Reasons for caring 
are rather special reasons, relating to the role matters can play in our life as a whole. We can 
explain them by reference to reasons generally, but not the other way round and we cannot rely 
on them to capture the way in which all values are normative. 
Coming finally to the third point, for Korsgaard having a cultural nature means being 
collectively, as a species, capable of developing a variety of ways of life, and having the need or 
the drive to do so. I agree with Korsgaard that there is no point to cultural values unless there are 
valuers with a cultural nature. I also agree with her that in engaging in cultural activities we 
should choose good ones rather than bad ones. What determines what are valuable cultural 
activities and what not? Cultural values. What determines that something is a cultural value, 
rather than what Korsgaard calls “a bad value”?  
This is not a problem about pluralism. Korsgaard welcomes the existence of a plurality of 
cultural values. She says 
Could the architectural values grounded in human nature, the values of architecture as 
such, determine a single absolutely best or right form of, say, dwelling? I do not suppose 
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that any of us will find this particular possibility tempting. This is in part because among 
the things that human beings in fact appreciate in architecture is variety, it is in part 
because human nature is essentially exploratory.[REF] 
It is a puzzle about whether the general nature of culture as a way of life such that people can 
have various ways of life, and a taste for them, can provide sufficient criteria for the 
determination of good and bad cultural values. The subject, the fact that we can ask critical 
questions of ourselves, etc., cannot provide the answers to the questions we ask. Nor can our taste 
for variety, and our exploratory nature do that. They are as responsible for values as for what she 
calls “bad values”. It all rests on the internal standard of culture, which we should care about 
because we have a cultural nature. That is where I find difficulty in following Korsgaard’s 
reasoning. I do not understand what is the internal standard of culture, and how it determines 
which novels, paintings, buildings, operas, string quartets, are good. 
How are such matters determined on my view? Here is one way one may be led to 
Korsgaard’s position by criticising mine: I agree to the obvious, i.e. that there are kinds partly 
constituted by standards of excellence for members of the kind which are not standards of value. I 
protest that while on my account cultural values are kind-based, not all kinds are kinds of value. 
Some are kinds of ‘bads’ and some are indifferent in value. Korsgaard turns to human nature to 
provide the reasons for caring about certain of these kinds, and therefore about their internal 
standards, thus providing a test by which we can tell which of them are inherently good, 
inherently bad, or neither. I availed myself of the distinction but said nothing about how it is 
determined. We can agree that only if a kind is a kind of value does it follow that if an item is 
good of that kind it is, pro tanto, good. We can agree that if it is good there is reason to engage in 
it and reason to respect it. These may be so-called formal features of value. They do nothing to 
tell us what is of value. Korsgaard, whatever the difficulties with her account, at least tries. 
I fear that that charge misses the point of my claim that there is mutual dependence 
between values and valuers and between the concepts of them. It is not so much that my ‘theory 
chases its own tail’ as that it denies that between these two one is head and the other tail. As I see 
it, the search for heads is a search for non-existing shortcuts, a search for secure foundations, 
secure tests, which enable us to determine what is value. All value flows from one source, and all 
we have to do is get to the source and follow the trail. I am not saying that Korsgaard is 
committed to a foundationalist, linear, view of the process. But I think that the feeling that her, as 
yet unfulfilled, project of accounting for value and normativity is holding a promise which mine 
(as yet full of gaps, etc.) does not is due to a yearning for the certainties of foundationalism, and 
of a linear direction of argument from a single source. Wish that it were possible, I may say. For I 
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believe that it is not and we need to employ all the evaluative/normative concepts at our disposal, 
and resort to many of their essential properties, to understand and establish the nature of any of 
them, and to establish the nature of what is good or bad. We need to understand the nature of 
value to understand who can be a valuer, and the nature of valuers to understand what are values, 
and what can be of value. To establish which kind-constituting standard is the standard of a value, 
and which is not we need to deploy arguments which use evaluative premises to establish that the 
standard is one of a distinct value or that it is not. There is no way to do so without presupposing 
some value judgements, no test of what are values, or what is valuable which starts with nothing, 
with no beliefs about values.20 I said a little about the reasons for that in the lectures, though the 
argument there is very incomplete. 
Perhaps I should add a word about health, given its importance in Korsgaard’s comment. 
At the start of the lectures, to illustrate the significance of the fact that they are only about 
intrinsic values, I said:  
‘the value of the means of personal survival, such as food, shelter, good health, is merely 
instrumental’, adding in a footnote: ‘That is qua means of survival their value is merely 
instrumental. Those same things may also have value for other reasons’.[REF] 
Korsgaard is quite right to insist that health is not merely a means of longevity. It is the 
means for or a necessary precondition of being able to engage in many valuable pursuits during 
our life, however short it may be. She is right that longevity is not a goal in itself, not without the 
ability to and the prospect of engaging in worthwhile activities. She is also right in saying that we 
are often rather reckless in our attribution of ‘mere instrumental’ value to things, and I am no 
exception. I do not share her doubts about the cogency of the notion, or of the explanation of it 
given at the beginning of the lectures. I feel that her doubts stem in part from the fact that, when 
discussing values, she does not have values in mind, but rather kinds constituted by standards and 
the way instances of them measure up in terms of those standards. But I do agree that we are 
often careless in failing to distinguish between a thing having instrumental value and it being a 
precondition of something of value, etc. Health may be a case in point.  
But these are incidental to the main issue in contention between us. Health is one of the 
conditions enabling us to function well and maximising our options. The more impaired our 
health the less able are we to function well, and the fewer are our options. It is in this regard like 
                                                     
20  And of course in this regard evaluative beliefs are like beliefs about material objects and their 
properties, and like beliefs about psychological properties, etc. There is no test for what there is in ‘the 
material world’. We reason from some beliefs about which material objects there are and what properties 
they have others, etc. 
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having all one’s limbs, or having skills, or having money. It differs from them, as it is associated 
with sensations of physical well being which are intrinsically valuable. As a condition of our 
ability and of many of our options it is a condition of both good and ill. It enables us to pursue 
valuable options, but also to pursue base and evil ones. It is not itself valuable except through its 
association with the sensations of well being, and in as much as it happens to be part of some 
cultural goal, comparable to body-building. These cases apart, its value depends on the use made 
of it. It is therefore no more than instrumentally valuable, and valuable as a condition of valuable 
options and abilities. 
Korsgaard thinks that it is intrinsically valuable because (a) it is the intrinsic excellence 
of our physical nature, and (b) our physical nature is ours and we therefore have reason to care 
about it. I believe that we have reason to foster our health only in as much as we have valuable 
and realistic goals and pursuits for which it is a precondition. The issue is not who is right about 
the explanation of the value of health, but who is right about the sorts of consideration which 
determine its value. The considerations I adduced are of a familiar type, which we rely on 
commonly. They apply, not in the details of their content, but in their form, to the value of 
education, of rest, and much else. I do not suppose that Korsgaard would wish to deny that, 
whether or not her own argument is sound, they are cogent considerations, and that, whatever else 
can be said about health, the conclusions they point to are sound as well. But what else can be 
said about health? Is Korsgaard right that it matters just because we have a physical nature 
regardless of how that nature relates to our goals and ambitions for our life, that it matters 
independently of whether we have or should have any goals and ambitions for our life, 
independently of whether our life has value of any kind at all? I do not think that what she says 
commits her to such a view. But if the value of health is conditional on the value of our life, and 
on the nature of the goals and ambitions we have or should have for our life, then is it not the case 
that its value is the value of a condition which makes that life, and the realisation of those goals 
and ambitions possible? 
Pluralism and liberalism 
Given that buildings have a general function in human life, they must meet certain 
universal normative standards, standards that enable them to serve those functions, and 
the result will be universal architectural values. And those values might conceivably 
determine that one genre is better than another.[REF]  
In passages like these Korsgaard appears to think that I claimed that it is necessary that there are 
many distinct architectural values. In fact I agree with her that it is not necessary that there be 
such a plurality. It is essential to my position that whether there are any cultural values, and 
which cultural values exist are contingent matters. Korsgaard seems to acknowledge that the 
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genus-based account of some values contributes to establishing the possibility of value pluralism. 
Of course, once the possibility of value pluralism is acknowledged then, given the account of 
values I advanced, it is a relatively trivial matter to establish that value pluralism is with us. As 
the comments on the lectures illustrate, what concerns most commentators on value pluralism is 
not the pluralism of cultural values, the plurality of intrinsically valuable forms of interpersonal-
relations, of ways of life, or of forms of excellence in the arts, and the like. Their concern is with 
the plurality of so-called moral values, and of political forms of organisation, topics on which I 
said nothing in the lectures.21 
Remarking on my view that values come into being at a particular time, and applying it to 
liberal values22, Williams asks 
what, on his [i.e. my] view, does that mean for our evaluations of the world before that 
time? We may recall that … Raz said that once a value comes into being “it bears on 
everything”.  … I take it that Raz means that we can apply the value to states of the world 
before that value existed.  It is of course true that we can say evaluative things about 
earlier societies, and some of them are more sensible than others …  But the present 
question is more particular: whether on Raz’s view the specific values of liberal 
democracy apply to or “bear on” earlier societies, such as those of the Middle Ages or the 
ancient world.  … What are we supposed to say about these people?  It can hardly have 
been a cognitive failure of theirs, not to recognise a value which did not yet exist.  … 
Was it a failing of theirs in terms of that very value not to have brought that value into 
existence?  Was it a failing of theirs at all that their practices did not accord with these 
values, as it is a failing in some contemporary societies?  Was it even a deficiency of their 
societies, if it was not yet historically possible for a society to embody these values?  If it 
was not a failing or deficiency of any kind, what is it for the values to apply to them? ... 
There are also real interpretational and ethical questions: how far is it pointful 
and helpful to discuss earlier states of the world in terms of our more local values?   How 
local are our values?  Certainly, as I have said, there is nothing in the nature of the 
universe or of language to stop one applying one’s values in this way.  As I have put it in 
another connection, you can be Kant at the Court of King Arthur if you want to. The 
question is the extent to which it is reasonable and helpful to do so, or rather gets in the 
way of understanding; in particular, of understanding how we differ from the past, and 
hence who we are.  [REF] 
                                                     
21  This preoccupation with political values explains, I suspect, Pippin’s comment that value 
pluralism ‘is a distinct product of the liberal, democratic, Western, humanistic tradition -  and foreign to 
many others, we most certainly do believe it is superior to jingoistic nationalism, the ways of the Taliban, 
the attacks by Chinese authorities on Falun Gong and so forth.’ Williams has replied to this contention. Let 
me just add that what we believe in and the jingoistic nationalists deny is not value pluralism, as explained 
in the lectures (a view which is far from commanding universal agreement among ‘us’) but the value of 
some practices, and the value of tolerating them even if they are mistaken. One need not believe in value 
pluralism to condemn this kind of jingoistic nationalism, and its repressive practices. 
22  I did not in the lectures, and will not here, address the question what if any are these values. I have 
discussed these matters elsewhere. Here I only wish to comment on the connection between contemporary 
liberal thought and the account in my lectures. 
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I have already expressed my agreement with the sentiments expressed in the last paragraph. But I 
do not think that the social dependence thesis does much to help deal with the question posed by 
Williams in the first paragraph and that is for the very reason he mentions, that is, once a value 
exists it applies to everything, including to things which took place before it existed. If liberal 
values do not apply to the Court of King Arthur this is because they do not apply universally. To 
be short, though crude, about it I would say that they apply only to advanced capitalist societies. 
To function well political arrangements, their institutions and principles alike, have to be suited to 
the social, cultural and economic conditions of the societies they govern. Otherwise they are 
liable to cause more harm than good. Liberal principles and institutional arrangements would 
have been as counter-productive as they are unimaginable in the Middle Ages. To come to this 
conclusion no assumption about the time they came into being is needed. The conditions which 
limit the application of certain principles to appropriate conditions apply, of course, to existing 
principles. 
 This is not to say that the repression of gays, or racial discrimination, or female 
circumcision were ever other than morally abhorrent, but it is typical that we tend to regard 
values or principles whose application is not restricted to favourable social, cultural or economic 
conditions as moral rather than political. Be that as it may, without going into detailed 
examination of this principle or that value, all one can say is that by and large my thesis about the 
temporal and contingent element in values parallels and chimes in its practical implications with 
the fact that political principles and institutions are contingently suitable to specific conditions of 
human societies.23 It is not, however, the basis for such conclusions. 
 All this is in principle consistent with thinking that liberal principles and institutions, or 
any others, are superior to all rival political principles and institutions. It is possible to hold that, 
and therefore maintain that if they can bear their beneficial fruits only under certain conditions it 
is important to bring about those conditions, etc. But, ‘I find this very hard to believe’, to quote 
Williams, and for the very reasons he gives in his comment: 
                                                     
23  That the suitability of political arrangements is determined by other social factors does not deny, 
of course, that existing political arrangements have a deep influence on other aspects of social life. I do not 
hold the view that political principles and values are some sort of ‘superstructure’, made suitable by some 
‘base’, without having causal effects on the character of the existing ‘base’. 
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The peculiarity of human beings is their capacity and need to live under culture, and I do 
not see how it could be that this capacity and need, properly understood, will reveal that 
human beings are really “meant to” to live under one fairly specific form of culture, that 
of liberal modernity.24[REF] 
Pippin was alone among the commentators in remarking on my contention regarding 
interpretation and under-determination. Among other things he observes that  
Both defenders and opponents of affirmative action may be responding to a general 
underdetermination in the way our social practices sustain the value of, guide 
interpretations of, rights protection, or fair social entitlement, a value they both agree on. 
But the fact that they agree on the absolute value of rights protection is largely irrelevant 
when compared with the depth of their disagreement, and the unavoidability of some 
decision. Our suspicion that reason is incapable of ever resolving the dispute in favor of 
one side or the other (that the matter is therefore essentially a political contestation, a 
struggle for power) remains a genuine anxiety.[REF] 
I may not have put the matter in precisely these terms, but essentially we agree here. I 
share Pippin’s awareness of the limits of reason, and one of the aims of establishing its power and 
credentials is to establish where its writ does not run. I do not share his apprehension of loss of 
faith in philosophy given its inability to solve disputes such as the one he alludes to above. I do 
not think that philosophy has all that much to contribute to the solution of such disputes. It is a 
fallacy, encouraged by some of the most successful recent writers in political philosophy, that 
philosophy can out of its own resources do much to solve deep social divisions and social 
problems. 
But nor do I believe that that means that appeal to values, principles, and reasoned 
arguments has nothing to do with these disputes. On the contrary, the disputes cannot take place 
in anything like the form they do but for their appeal to values and principles. The very under-
determined rights, principles and values, which fail to resolve the disputes, frame them, define 
their terms, and the nature of the aspirations of the rival parties. Nor is the fact that the issues are 
under-determined by values show that the disputes are no more than a naked power struggle, and 
the appeal to reasons a mere self-serving rationalisation. It is true that the parties are rarely clear 
about the philosophical presuppositions of their claims, but that is not unique to disputes where 
                                                     
24  Williams adds: ‘Underlying this is a more general issue of principle. If there is such a thing as an 
essential nature of human beings, there is only one way in which it can rule anything out – by making it 
impossible. If it has failed to rule it out in that way, it cannot try to catch up by sending normative 
signals’.[REF] This is, however, less clear if one accepts the possibility that there are normative aspects of 
human nature. This would make it possible for some essential human features to send ‘the normative 
signals’ by which other matters may be judged. Like him I do not think that this is much help in singling 
out preferred forms of culture. The one qualification I would enter is that human nature may mark some 
matters, like susceptibility to pain and its potential consequences, or the importance of sex to human 
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reason under-determines the issue. What matters is that the rival parties advance ideals, 
representing different ways in which values can be implemented, or developed. They appeal to 
the public’s imagination, trying to convince it to opt for their vision and against its rivals. It is not 
a process with a unique rational outcome. But it is not one where values and reasons play no role. 
We can compare it to two friends debating the relative merits of two films, neither of 
which is better than the other, but where each friend strongly likes one and dislikes the other. (It 
is perfectly alright not to like things of value, provided one is not basing the dislike on false 
beliefs). They like what they like for good reasons (let us assume) and they try to show the other 
how attractive is their favourite film by invoking those reasons. That is one way in which people 
come to develop a taste for one style or another, in films, clothes, friendship and much else. Not 
because it is rationally superior to others, but because it appeals to one, hopefully for good 
reasons, more than alternatives which have no lesser reasons in their favour. Our responses to 
rival political ideals or policies are often similar. That is, often there are reasons for both ideals 
and neither is better than the other. Some of us will be attracted to one of the ideals, while others 
are attracted to their rivals. We try to make others share our taste by presenting the ideals or 
policies to them in ways which display their attractions, make them more visible, more palpable 
to those who as yet do not share our preferences. 
In the lectures I highlighted a somewhat different, though related, manifestation of 
underdetermination by reason. Such underdetermination, I said, often manifests itself in the fact 
that there are rival interpretations of common ideals none of which are superior to the others. 
Different interpretations would support somewhat different courses of action, somewhat different 
institutional arrangements, etc. But neither can be said to be the best. In such cases, it is evident 
that reason plays a crucial role in the political advocacy of the rival camps, for their views, being 
interpretations of common ideals, cannot even be understood except by understanding the values 
which underlie these ideals, and the way they play their role in the different interpretations of 
them. 
It is important that we should not exaggerate what we can establish by force of reason, 
and that we should realise that one crucial test of a satisfactory constitution is that it allows 
channels for causes to be promoted for good decisive reasons, and another is that it allows 
channels for causes to be promoted, and for reasonable distributive decisions to be made, because 
                                                                                                                                                              
experience, which do send normative signals as to the fact that some aspects of cultures are repressive. 
These enable us to condemn some aspects of all human societies known to us. 
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they represent people’s preferences which though based on reasons are not superior to some 
alternatives which they could have opted for, and that others in the population prefer. 
 
